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THE CONSTITUTION, THE CIVILIAN, AND
MILITARY JUSTICE
ARTHUR E. SUTHMLAND, JR. t
F UNDAMNTimS of constitutional law remain the same from
generation to generation; its manifestations continually
change with the changing circumstances of man's life. The
boundary between justice for the soldier and justice for the
civilian offers one example. We have come far since the
day of small professional armies which gave rise to our
concepts of military justice; since the day when the soldier
lived apart from the rest of society; since, within a generally
civilian people, he dwelt in a small isolated group sub-
ject to his own laws and customs, apart from his fellow
man. Like all the rest of us, the man-at-arms has been
much affected by those technological and organizational
changes which, in war, turn the efforts of a whole society
toward victory in the field, and which, even in what we call
peace, require that we maintain millions of men, basically
civilians, enrolled for a time in the armed forces. We
station garrisons abroad at scores of points, and send whole
families along. And the technological developments which
have made war more and more a branch of mechanical
engineering, which have made victory dependent on the
skilled manipulation and maintenance of innumerable in-
tricate machines, not only make necessary profound changes
in the training of military men, but, even more striking,
call into association with men-at-arms increasing numbers
of civilian scientists, technologists, and specialists of all
sorts who keep the machines of war in operation.
This change toward partly civilian military forces makes
more difficult and delicate the establishment of a balance be-
tween the individual's claim to all the careful procedures
t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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of the judicial process and, on the other hand, the necessity
for unquestioning discipline which is the essence of military
survival. Military law, like the law generally, tends to lag
behind social and technological development. This paper
treats, in a general way, of the adaptation of constitutional
law to this new order, where in substance, if not in theory,
the status of soldier merges more and more with that of
civilian.
None of these matters is entirely new. Renaissance
artillerymen were often civilian technicians, respected by
the soldiery for knowledge of difficult mysteries. The
memoirs of Baroness von Riedesel demonstrate that those
who today share the comparatively pleasant life of civilian
dependents in one of our far-called military installations,
had predecessors who faced sterner tests as they moved
down the Lakes with Burgoyne's column. The War of
Independence had its sutlers, waggoners, and laundresses.
Civilian "packers" were famous ninety years ago, with our
armies on the plains, for hardihood in Indian warfare, for
mastery of pack-animals, and for resistance to certain sober
aspects of military regimentation. The civilian paymaster-
clerk was for many generations a necessary functionary with
the forces afloat. But in our day, the discipline of civilians
who follow the flag takes on a new quality because of their
sheer numbers. One remembers, between 1941 and 1945,
the Red Cross people overseas, the UNRRA functionaries,
the merchant mariners, the political advisers who ac-
companied major commanders with their civilian specialists
and secretaries, demonstrating that under modern con-
ditions Clausewitz's dichotomy between war and diplomacy
had become less clear. Within the past few months, the
expenditures of military dependents abroad have been
thought to imperil our international balance of payments.
In modern war then, in the preparation for war, and in
the long liquidation of past wars, civilians who follow
the flag abroad pose new burdens and risks. Methods of
organization and discipline once important only to a small
and self-conscious military fraternity, now in varying de-
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grees, depending on time, geography, and international tem-
perature, affect a whole society abroad and at home.
A more familiar allied constitutional question concerns
the civil liberty of the man-at-arms in his nonmilitary affairs.
Locke wrote in the eleventh chapter of his Second Treatise
of Government:
[T]o let us see that even absolute power, where it is necessary,
is not arbitrary by being absolute, but is still limited by that reason.
and confined to those ends which required it in some cases to be
absolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of
martial discipline; for the preservation of the Army, and in it
of the whole commonwealth, requires an absolute obedience to
the command of every superior officer, and it is justly death to
disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them;
but yet we see that neither the sergeant, that could command a
soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach
where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to
give him one penny of his money; nor the general,. that can
condemn him to death for deserting his post or for not obeying
the most desperate orders, can yet, with all his absolute power of
life and death, dispose of one farthing of that soldier's estate
or seize one jot of his goods, whom yet he can command any
thing, and hang for the least disobedience.
The draftsmen of our Bill of Rights were men of long
memories; in 1789, when they formulated our fifth amend-
ment, the Petition of Right of 1628, with its protest against
extension of military procedures to civilians, was closer
to them in time than we now are to their day. Yet they
were satisfied to treat the separation of military from civil
justice in only a few words. Perhaps the line between
"cases arising in the land or naval forces" and other cases
seemed clearer then than it now does.
At the outset, as in most constitutional controversies,
one has here to begin making distinctions on which con-
stitutional rights may depend. Despite the concept of "cold
war" which blurs the difference between war and peace,
there is still a difference between a nation situated as
the United States was in 1943, and a nation in our present
state. There is a difference between "forces in the field"
and forces in garrison at home; Fort Dix is not Heartbreak
1961]
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Ridge. There is a difference between matters overseas
and matters at home; our airmen at a base in the peaceful
English countryside are scarcely "in the field" in any con-
ventional sense, yet their status is surely different from
that of a like group of young men in Bedford, Massachusetts.
There is still a difference between the iNavy and the other
armed forces; men sailing on or under the sea may be
isolated for long periods; they are in a situation quite
different from men in the ground forces stationed overseas
but localized in a highly developed modern camp with
abundant transportation and communication. There may
well be a significant difference between the families of
military men who accompany husbands and fathers on long
tours of duty abroad, and, on the other hand, men who,
though still called civilians, have engaged by contract to
accompany armed forces to far places in the world and
to support their military readiness by the exercise of
scientific, technological, or administrative skills.
These and like considerations come to the mind of
the reflective lawyer who reads McElroy v. United States
ex rel. Guagliardo,' decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States on the eighteenth day of January 1960.
Guagliardo was a civilian technician, an electrical line-
man under contract with the Air Force. He had not gone
through the ritual of enlistment. His duties took him to
Nouasseur Air Depot in Morocco, where he stole supplies.
He was tried by court-martial under Article 2(11) of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, was convicted, and was
sentenced to the disciplinary barracks at New Cumberland,
Pennsylvania. He was released on habeas corpus by the
Court of Appeals; the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed on the ground that he was not subject to a military
trial. The American constitutionalist faced with auagliardo
and its companion cases 2 asks how they came to be so
decided, and what is to be done hereafter with civilians
1361 U.S. 281 (1960).
2 See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960);
Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) ; and Wilson v. Bohlender, reported
with the Guagliardo case.
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accompanying the armed forces overseas. Lessons may be
learned from an attempt to answer both questions.
A facile answer to the first of these questions can ac-
count for the Supreme Court's treatment of Guagliardo,
the civilian employee, by explaining that it is merely a
legal extrapolation of the similar decisions three years
earlier in the cases of wives of servicemen charged with
capital offenses.3 But this explanation may be a bit too
easy. Four of the nine Justices dissented in (-uagliardo.
Mr. Justice Clark, who there wrote the prevailing opinion,
had voted to uphold Mrs. Covert's military conviction. The
prevailing and dissenting opinions of troubled, conscientious
judges in Guagliardo's case demonstrate the difficulty of
arriving at the conclusion the Supreme Court reached. I
suggest that underlying C-uagliardo and its companion
cases, as well as the Covert and Smith cases of 1957, was
one of those major premises which, as Holmes once wrote,4
practical men generally prefer to leave inarticulate-that
the military will not surely do reasonable justice, and that
military jurisdiction must be restrained, even at serious cost
in efficiency and money. The responsibility for this under-
lying premise is not limited to men in uniform. Great
civilian leaders of the nation shared in the mistakes which
produced that inarticulate premise. In justice to my one-
time companions in the Services, I hasten to say that I do
not here state that this premise is correct. I say that it
exists. For it we must share the blame, and because
of it, take the consequences.
One reads today the account of affairs in Hawaii which
gave rise to Duncan v. Kahianamoku&5 with a sense of
regret, with a feeling that this should not have happened.
3 In June 1957, the Supreme Court held invalid the military conviction of
Mrs. Clarice Covert and Mrs. Dorothy Smith, on charges of murder of their
husbands, servicemen stationed abroad. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
The case was tried together with Kinsella v. Krueger.
4 See Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HAv. L. REv.
417, 420 (1899); HoLmEs, CLLEcrED LEGAL PAPERS, 203, 209 (1920).
5327 U.S. 304 (1946). See Fairman, The Supreme Court on Military
Jurisdiction: Martial Rule in Hawaii and the Yamashita Case, 59 HARv. L.
REv. 833 (1946).
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There was no adequate reason, military or other, for the
unseemly wrangle which continued as late as 1944 between
military and civil administration in the Islands. Although
today's critic must remember the stunning, tragic surprise
of Pearl Harbor and the natural reaction of military com-
manders seeking to avoid a repetition, still wisdom is a
necessity for senior men-at-arms who are governing a civil
population. When military men forget this in a democracy,
trouble follows.
The Japanese relocations on the West Coast are not
now pleasant to remember. One finds himself defensive in
explaining them. With all the sympathy in the world for
the practical difficulties of counter-intelligence that has to
be conducted by young men of good intention but no
very deep experience, one wishes that the problems which
gave rise to the relocations might have been settled some
other way. One of the senior officers in charge of a large
part of this operation officially reported as of February
14, 1942, "The very fact that no sabotage has taken place
to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such
action will be taken"; 6 he did not, by this extraordinary
statement, strengthen civilian confidence in the wisdom
and responsibility of the military.
The reports of General Yamashita's trial did little to
add to the trust of thoughtful people in military justice.'
Accounts of the investigatory procedures in the Malmedy
cases 8 had a similar effect. The difficulty is that people
tend to believe the worst, and to characterize any regime
by occasional deplorable incidents, not by generally com-
mendable character. The thousands of court-martial cases
in which military judges were restrained and conscientious,
the distinguished record of able defense by military counsel,
6 See this statement quoted in Mr. Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion in
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 241 n.15 (1944).
7 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). One of the army officers as-
signed as counsel for General Yamashita wrote an account of his experiences;
see. RExL, THE CASE OF GFNERA. YAMASHITA (1949).
S See Everett v. Truman, 334 U.S. 824 (1948), and the proceedings
described in Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the
Flag, I STAN. L. REv. 587, 597 (1949).
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the scrupulous administrative review of cases in military
channels, the poise and wisdom of the judgments of the
United States Court of Military Appeals-none of these
has sufficed to wipe out the memory of some conspicuous
mistakes. And because these were the mistakes not of a
few people, but mistakes unchallenged at the time by a great
many of us, we must now share some of the responsibility
for the inarticulate major premise of Guaglicrdo.
The first lesson, therefore, is that where a whole nation
is to be recurrently in arms, the training and the practice
of senior military men must be thoughtful and restrained
and just. We can learn to reconcile this with taut and
efficient discipline; we must do so, for failure either of
discipline or of justice brings intolerable consequences in
its train.
What can now be done with military justice for the
civilian? This question can be answered in at least three
ways, any of which brings difficulties. We can turn civilians,
or some of them, into military men, or something sufficiently
resembling military men, so that a trial like Guagliardo's
becomes constitutional. Or we can accept the constitutional
necessity for proceeding on criminal charges against civilians
serving with the armed forces with all the formalities of
Article III of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Or
we can leave civilian justice to the courts of the nation
where the civilian is stationed. Or we can sometimes follow
one course, sometimes another. The first of these pos-
sibilities, turning civilians into military men, is suggested
in the opinion of the Court in aimgliardo. The Court
tells us that we might possibly proceed as the Navy did
with its civilian paymaster's clerks.9 The Court stressed
the fact that the paymaster's clerk had a position im-
portant in the machinery of the Navy, that his appoint-
ment was made only on approval of the ship's commander,
that he had permanent tenure "until discharged," and
that he was required to agree in writing "to submit to
9 See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284-86
(1960), citing Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
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the laws and requirements for the government and dis-
cipline of the Navy." All of these criteria could be made
to apply to most civilian employees of the armed forces.
They would not be so employed by the government for
service abroad unless their service was important and
unless some senior official approved their appointment.
Tenure permanent until terminated does not seem a difficult
condition to achieve. And voluntary acceptance of court-
martial jurisdiction, as the rnuagliardo opinion suggests,
might eliminate some difficulties. But doubt lingers. Does
a civilian, dressed in a uniform and relabeled a soldier, so
simply lose the procedural guarantees which freed Gua-
gliardo? And will well-paid and perhaps somewhat undis-
ciplined civilian technicians "enlist" in sufficient numbers?
And what of dependents?
Perhaps the second possibility is easier. Why not take
a civilian Article III court overseas to the accused? The
sixth amendment guarantee of a jury "of the State and
district where the crime shall have been committed" seems
not to apply to crimes committed abroad. We are ac-
customed to trying our nationals in the United States on
charges of commission of civilian crimes in foreign countries.
This was the situation in Best r. United States,"0 where the
defendant was convicted in a district court of the United
States in the District of Massachusetts on a charge of
treason committed in Vienna, Austria, and in Kawackita v.
United States," where the treason occurred in Japan. There
appears to be no constitutional obstacle preventing an
Article III trial abroad. There is no provision in the fifth
amendment guarantee of indictment by grand jury com-
parable to the provision in the sixth amendment concerning
"the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed." Under the conditions which obtain in a large
American installation abroad, it would perhaps be possible
to assemble a grand and petit jury from the military and
civilian personnel available, and to commission a certain
10 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951).
11343 U.S. 717 (1952).
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number of United States district judges, or to assign such
judges from those already commissioned, to hold court on
circuit in other countries. To be sure, jury service would
require the time of some of our civilian and service per-
sonnel stationed abroad. The Supreme Court has held that
civilian government employment is no disqualification for
such service,12 and no reason appears why military employ-
ment should disqualify either. Service wives might perhaps
occupy some of the posts on grand and petit juries. There
would be some delay involved. One would not expect to
find a United States district judge immediately available
at each of the several scores of foreign stations where
our civilians may get into trouble. In posts where per-
sonnel are comparatively few, time might be required to
assemble a grand and petit jury. Professional counsel, to
which the civilian defendant is constitutionally entitled
under the sixth amendment, might present a difficulty. But
members of the Bar in uniform are nowadays available at
a great many foreign posts, and these, it would seem, should
fill the constitutional requirement for defense counsel in
those instances where the accused could not afford or
would not choose to obtain privately employed counsel
for his defense.
A great many defendants might well waive a grand
and petit jury once charges were brought, particularly when
it became apparent that a speedy and fair trial could be
had before a civilian judge. Experience in those juris-
dictions where defendants on criminal charges may waive
juries demonstrates that a great many do so in order to
expedite disposal of their cases, or because they prefer the
judgment of a trained and wise professional. And indeed,
provision of civilian trials of the sort here suggested might
be welcome to the military as relieving them of court-
martial duties which take them away from the primary
function of the man-at-arms.
If Article III trials for civilians abroad are constitu-
tionally possible, they would be much preferable to a system
12 Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948).
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of bringing back to the United States for trial civilians who
offend abroad. The inconvenience and delays occasioned by
the transportation of witnesses back to the United States
from Korea, Turkey, Germany or England while their
milita-y functions go unperformed, or are performed by
substitute personnel, would be avoided if the offenses could
be prosecuted where they occur. Some revision of the
Status of Forces treaties would be necessary, and this might
prove an obstacle embarrassing if not insuperable. 1 3  Still,
this escape from the Guagliardo dilemma seems well worth
study.
The third possibility remains-trial in the courts of
the country where the offense occurs. This practice was
constitutionally upheld in Wilson v. Girard.4 It may in
some instances be unwelcome to the personnel involved,
though certainly the Girard record indicates a trial of
scrupulous fairness.
For Guagliardo, as for most important human problems,
no perfect solution free of any disadvantage seems possible.
But the art of constitutional government is a practical
one to be applied in a less than perfect world. If men
were angels, we should need no trials among our forces
abroad. But, in this somewhat unlikely state of affairs,
we should need no forces either.
13 The possibility that civilian courts of the United States may administer
criminal justice over United States nationals in certain British territories
appears in an agreement of August 1, 1950, concerning leased naval and air
bases. See [1950] U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 585.
For the peculiarities of civilian jurisdiction in the Ryukyu Islands, see Schuck,
Trial of Civilian Personnel by Foreign Courts, PROCEEDINGS OF Am. BAR
Ass'N, SEcTroN OF INT'L AND CoMr. LAW 62 *(1958). The difficulties in the
way of renegotiating Status of Forces Agreements so as to permit our civilian
offenders to be tried abroad by our civilian courts, when their offenses are
also crimes under the law of the country where committed, are discussed in
the Report of the Committee on Status of Forces Agreements, PROCEEDINGS
OF Am. BAR Ass'N, SECrION OF INT'L AND ComeP. LAw 120 (1959). For
generous help in consideration of the problem of holding civilian trials
abroad and for the references here made I am much indebted to my colleague,
Professor Richard R. Baxter. He is not chargeable with any of my mistakes.
This paper would be much better if I could have written it with his great
background in military life and in the practical application of international
law.
14354 U.S. 524 (1957).
